The ERP correlates of self-knowledge: Are assessments of one’s past, present, and future traits closer to semantic or episodic memory? by Tanguay, Annick et al.
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
4	
THE	NEURAL	CORRELATES	OF	SELF-KNOWLEDGE	
	
Highlights 
• Self-knowledge (SK) is thought to be distinct from semantic and episodic memory (EM) 
• SK’s relationship to semantic and EM may depend to some extent on time perspective 
• LPC amplitude distinguished EM from present but not from past or future SK 
• P200, N400 and LPC amplitudes differentiated semantic memory from SK  
• The relationship between SK’s LPC and episodic memory depends on time perspective 
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The ERP correlates of self-knowledge: Are assessments one’s past, present, and future traits 
closer to semantic or episodic memory? 
1. Introduction 
	
The ancient Greeks’ invitation to “Know thyself” resonates to this day in popular culture. 
Despite this, self-knowledge is rarely integrated into current models of declarative memory. 
Declarative memory is usually described as consisting of semantic and episodic memory, which 
are depicted as two branches of a tree diagram (Squire & Wixted, 2015) or two extremes of a 
continuum (e.g., Jacoby & Craik, 1979; Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007). At one extreme, semantic 
memory concerns knowledge of facts that are detached from their context of acquisition and 
shared with other people in the culture (Binder & Desai, 2011; Lambon Ralph, Jefferies, 
Patterson, & Rogers, 2017). At the other extreme, episodic memory concerns our ability to 
remember events from our past and related contextual information (Tulving, 2002). Between 
these two extremes arguably falls personal semantics, which (like semantic memory) are factual 
and limited in spatial/temporal details, but (like episodic memory) are idiosyncratically personal. 
Personal semantics were broken down into four types in a recent review and taxonomy (Renoult, 
Davidson, Palombo, Moscovitch, & Levine, 2012). Two of the four types were hypothesized to 
be closer to episodic memory (i.e., memory for repeated events, autobiographically significant 
concepts), one as being closer to semantic memory (i.e., autobiographical facts), and one as 
being relatively distinct from both (i.e. self-knowledge; see Figure 1; Renoult et al., 2012). 
Recently, we have used ERPs to compare repeated events, autobiographically significant 
concepts, and autobiographical facts to semantic and episodic memory (Renoult et al., 2015, 
2016). Here we turn to the fourth operationalization of personal semantics: self-knowledge. 
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Figure 1. The 4 types of personal semantics in relation to semantic and episodic memory.  
 
1.1 Self-knowledge 
Self-knowledge entails evaluative judgments of oneself, and includes knowledge of one’s 
own traits and preferences (Renoult et al., 2012). Self-knowledge is arguably a highly abstract 
form of knowledge (Grilli & Verfaellie, 2014; Renoult et al., 2012), which in part could explain 
its apparent independence from episodic and semantic memory impairment (Klein & Gangi, 
2010). For example, amnesic patients can describe their post-morbid personality, indicating that 
self-knowledge can be updated despite episodic memory impairment (Craver, Kwan, Steindam, 
& Rosenbaum, 2014; Grilli & Verfaellie, 2015). In addition, self-knowledge can remain intact 
when another kind of personal semantics is impaired [i.e., autobiographical facts: knowledge of 
facts about oneself that resemble an autobiographical “CV”, including jobs, hobbies, diplomas; 
etc. (Klein, Cosmides, & Costabile, 2003; Klein, Cosmides, Costabile, & Mei, 2002; Renoult et 
al., 2012; Warrington & McCarthy, 1988)]. The reverse pattern has also been found: A patient 
with damage to medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) showed impaired insight into his own traits (i.e. 
self-knowledge) in the face of accurate knowledge of an acquaintance’s traits (Marquine et al., 
2016).  
1.2 Knowledge of Past, Present and Future Selves 
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 Conceptualizations of self-knowledge usually focus on the present self, but knowledge 
can extend to past selves and future “possible selves” (Markus & Nurius, 1986) or the 
“temporally extended self” (Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 2013). Two perspectives have been taken 
on the relative contribution of semantic and episodic memory to self-knowledge across time. 
From the first perspective, several have posited that episodic memory shapes self-knowledge 
through the elaboration of self-defining events in one’s past and future, and contributes to a sense 
of continuity of one’s identity in time (Demblon & D’Argembeau, 2016; Prebble et al., 2013). In 
these respects, traits are concepts that can acquire a personal significance through events, 
particularly when considering the past or the future (Demblon & D’Argembeau, 2016; Renoult et 
al., 2015). Semantic memory is usually argued to be associated with a subjective awareness 
based in the present, whereas episodic memory is associated with a subjective awareness 
oriented towards the past and possibly also the future (Tulving, 2001, 2002). This difference in 
temporal orientation might suggest that present self-knowledge is more similar to semantic 
memory, whereas past and future self-knowledge are more similar to episodic memory. 
However, the relationship between temporal orientation and episodic memory lends itself to 
potential confusion. A case study of amnesic patient KC found that he understood time as a 
concept, and he could orient to his past, present, and future (that is, he was not “stuck in the 
present”; Craver et al., 2014). To nuance this perspective, one might consider episodic memory 
as associated with awareness of oneself in a specific temporal context, including the ever-
changing present. If so, the neural correlates of present self-knowledge may be intermediate 
between semantic and episodic memory (Prebble et al., 2013). Present self-knowledge shares the 
personal and introspective characteristics of episodic memory that are absent from semantic 
memory. The (re)construction of self-defining events and the maintenance of a sense of 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
8	
THE	NEURAL	CORRELATES	OF	SELF-KNOWLEDGE	
	
continuity of one’s identity may additionally engage episodic memory in the past and the future. 
Although neuropsychological studies indicate that self-knowledge is independent of episodic 
memory (Klein & Gangi, 2010), it may become less so when the self-knowledge is accompanied 
by a spatial or temporal context (for example, the distant past or the future; see Grilli & 
Verfaellie, 2016). 
From the second perspective, however, some have suggested that semantic memory is 
essential for thinking about the past and future, particularly when events are novel (Irish, Addis, 
Hodges, & Piguet, 2012; Irish & Piguet, 2013; Wang, Yue, & Huang, 2016; Weiler, Suchan, 
Koch, Schwarz, & Daum, 2011)	. Semantic memory encompasses a variety of knowledge about 
the world, including knowledge of one’s culture’s typical “life periods” or “life chapters” and 
what novel experiences might involve (Thomsen, 2015).  For example, young adults could muse 
about or appraise their future identity in relation to the prototypical life narrative: (I will 
graduate from university, obtain a fulfilling job, buy a house, get married, have children, et 
cetera). As the case of KC has shown, semantic memory includes knowledge of time as a 
concept, and we note that he could order his autobiographical facts mostly correctly (Craver et 
al., 2014). The construal-level theory of psychological distance of Trope & Liberman (2010) 
stipulates that temporal distance makes us think more abstractly and thus in a more meaning-
based (i.e., semantic) than experience-based (i.e., episodic) manner. In a similar logic, La Corte 
and Piolino (2016) have suggested that thinking about a distant future increases the use of 
general or semanticized memories (including personal semantics) relative to a closer time. 
Concordant neuroimaging findings indicate that the neural correlates of thinking about 
temporally distant selves may be more similar to thinking about other people compared to the 
present self (D’Argembeau et al., 2008, 2010; see also Palombo, Hayes, Peterson, Keane, & 
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Verfaellie, in press). Taken together, this second perspective suggests that past and particularly 
future self-knowledge may rely more on semantic memory than present self-knowledge does.  
	
1.3.The Present Study 
Personal semantics are often compared to either semantic or episodic memory alone, but 
rarely to both. Yet, as seen in the review above, both semantic and episodic memory could be 
significantly related to self-knowledge. In the present study, we designed a novel task to compare 
the behavioral and electrophysiological correlates of self-knowledge to semantic and episodic 
memory in a within-subject design, and tested whether the temporal orientation of the self-
knowledge influences the relationship to semantic versus episodic memory. Thus, the study 
included five closely matched memory conditions: semantic and episodic memory, and past, 
present, and future self-knowledge. We operationalized self-knowledge as knowledge of one’s 
own personality traits, as this has been the most frequently studied operationalization (Renoult et 
al., 2012). In the self-knowledge tasks, participants decided whether target words (e.g., 
generous) reflected their past traits, present traits, or future traits. In the semantic memory task, 
participants indicated whether the words reflected the traits of most people holding a certain 
occupation. The episodic memory task also involved being shown traits, but deciding whether 
each trait had been seen previously during the study or not. We used positive (e.g., generous) and 
negative (e.g., jealous) traits, which we expected to show a distinct behavioral pattern across 
time perspectives. People tend to exhibit an optimistic belief that their personality improves 
through time and will become even  “better than average” in the future (D’Argembeau et al., 
2010; Kanten & Teigen, 2008; Wilson & Ross, 2001).  
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1.3.1 Semantic versus Episodic: N400 versus LPC Event-Related Potentials.  
We examined the neural correlates of the memory conditions using 
electroencephalography (EEG). We focused on two ERP components: the N400 and the LPC. 
The N400 is a negative amplitude ERP component occurring 250 to 500 ms after stimulus onset, 
maximal over centro-parietal sites (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). The N400 is sensitive to 
semantic processing; for example it is larger when words are unexpected or incongruent within 
the context of a sentence (e.g., “I take coffee with cream and dog”; Kutas and Federmeier (2011), 
but also, importantly, when words violate our knowledge of the world (Hagoort, Hald, 
Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004). In addition to these contextual effects, the N400 is also 
sensitive to the structure of semantic memory, as demonstrated for example by effects of 
concreteness, semantic category or semantic richness (reviewed in Renoult, 2016).  Its main 
neural generators are in the left temporal and inferior parietal cortex, consistent with N400’s role 
in the binding of multimodal conceptual representations (Kutas and Federmeier, 2011; Renoult, 
2016). Lesion studies have shown that left temporal-parietal lesions reduce N400 amplitudes and 
impair semantic comprehension (Friederici, Hahne, & von Cramon, 1998; Hagoort, Brown, & 
Swaab, 1996; Swaab, Brown, & Hagoort, 1997).  
The Late Positive Component (LPC) – also known as “the parietal old new effect” – is a 
positive amplitude component occurring 500 to 800 ms after stimulus onset, with a posterior 
parietal scalp distribution (Rugg & Curran, 2007). The LPC is reliably associated with episodic 
recollection, although it is also sensitive to the “true” status of the memory, and memory strength 
(Brezis, Bronfman, Yovel, & Goshen-Gottstein, 2016; Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Rugg & 
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Curran, 2007; Wilding & Ranganath, 2011). Bilateral hippocampal lesions greatly reduce the 
LPC (Addante, Ranganath, Olichney, & Yonelinas, 2012; Düzel, Vargha-Khadem, Heinze, & 
Mishkin, 2001; Olichney et al., 2000). Simultaneous EEG-fMRI associate the LPC with activity 
in the right posterior hippocampus, and parahippocampal and retrosplenial cortices (Hoppstädter, 
Baeuchl, Diener, Flor, & Meyer, 2015). The LPC may be sensitive to self-relevance as suggested 
in Coronel & Federmeier (2016), based partly on Fields and Kuperberg (2012), but a recent 
study indicates that the relationship may depend on various factors (Fields & Kuperberg, 2016; 
see Renoult et al., 2016). Thus, the N400 and the LPC are neural correlates of semantic and 
episodic processing, respectively, and they are distinguishable from one another (Düzel et al., 
2001; Olichney et al., 2000). 
In a recent study, Coronel and Federmeier (2016) compared self-knowledge -- 
operationalized as knowledge of personal preferences (e.g. do I like to wear pink clothes?) -- to 
knowledge of people’s preferences in general (e.g. do most people like to wear pink clothes?). 
Self-knowledge was associated with a larger LPC amplitude compared to others’ preferences at 
centro-parietal sites (Coronel & Federmeier, 2016). The N400 tended to be less negative for 
personal than others’ preferences at 26 sites over the scalp (qualitatively), but the scalp 
distribution, latency, and amplitude were not significantly different. Coronel and Federmeier's 
(2016) main goal was to compare the N400 of personal semantics and semantic memory, so they 
did not include a memory condition equivalent to episodic memory (e.g. did I wear pink clothes 
yesterday?). Other recent studies have demonstrated that personal semantics can be associated to 
different degrees with the N400 or LPC components (Choi, Cha, Jung, & Kim, 2017; Renoult et 
al., 2015, 2016).  
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EEG allows us to test the opposing (but not mutually exclusive) hypotheses about the 
neural correlates of self-knowledge reviewed in Section 1.2 above (see also Table 1): past and 
future self-knowledge may involve more semantic processing or more episodic processing, or 
possibly more of both, relative to present self-knowledge. The last scenario would translate into: 
1) A maximal N400 – the index of semantic processing – for semantic memory, followed by past 
and future self-knowledge, while it would be minimal for episodic memory (and possibly also 
for present self-knowledge), and 2) a maximal LPC – the index of episodic processing – for 
episodic memory, followed by past and future self-knowledge, and minimal for semantic 
memory, with present self-knowledge in the intermediate between semantic and episodic 
memory. While the above hypotheses for a time-related modulation of the LPC have a solid 
basis, the direction of a temporal modulation for the N400 lends itself to multiple interpretations. 
Present self-knowledge shares important conceptual similarities with semantic memory, 
rendering the opposite hypothesis equally likely (i.e. semantic memory > present self-knowledge 
> past and future self-knowledge). For instance, present self-knowledge represents best the stable 
(present/atemporal) portion of personality (Anusic & Schimmack, 2016); that is, the stable traits 
that are detached from a context of acquisition (or projection). Lastly, in keeping with a vast 
literature (Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Rugg & Curran, 2007; Wilding & Ranganath, 2011), 
modulation of the LPC by the old/new effect (i.e., greater amplitude for hits than correct 
rejections) should be observed for the recognition memory task. 
Table 1: Hypotheses for ERP data based on the first or second perspective.  
 Predictions based on the first perspective (self defined through events) 
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N400 
Maximal (i.e., most 
negative) 
  Minimal (i.e., 
least negative) 
semantic memory 
task 
>/= present self 
 
>/= past and future 
self 
episodic 
memory task 
LPC 
Maximal (i.e., most 
positive) 
  Minimal (i.e., 
least positive) 
episodic memory 
task 
>/= past and future 
self 
>/=  present self semantic 
memory task 
Predictions based the second perspective (self-construal theory) 
N400 
Maximal (i.e, most 
negative) 
  Minimal (i.e, 
least negative) 
semantic memory 
task 
>/= past and future 
self 
>/= Present self episodic 
memory task 
LPC 
Maximal (i.e., most   Minimal (i.e., 
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positive) least positive) 
episodic memory 
task 
>/= present self >/= past and future 
self 
semantic 
memory task 
 
	
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Participants 
Thirty-two participants (15 men) took part in the study. They were aged between 18 and 
33 years old (mean age: 20.97 ± 0.66 SE; one participant did not report his age), and had 
completed an average of 14.84 (± 0.39 SE) years of education. Undergraduate psychology 
students at the University of East Anglia were recruited through an online system and awarded 
partial course credit. Others were recruited through a participant panel at the School of 
Psychology of the University of East Anglia; they contacted the researcher after obtaining 
information about the study via email, and received £13 for their participation. Exclusion criteria 
consisted of a history of head injury with loss of consciousness longer than 5 min, other 
neurological or medical conditions known to compromise brain function, and active substance 
abuse. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were English native speakers, 
and were right-handed. Two participants did not meet eligibility criteria, and two were excluded 
due to a low number of yes responses (< 15), resulting in a sample of 28 participants. 
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The study received ethics approval from the Research Ethics Committee of the School of 
Psychology at the University of East Anglia (2016-0195-000370) and the Health Sciences and 
Science Research Ethics Board of the University of Ottawa (H10-16-20). 
 
2.2 Experimental Tasks  
Our study included five memory conditions: semantic memory, episodic memory, and 
past, present, and future self-knowledge conditions. The inclusion of these self-knowledge 
conditions was inspired by D’Argembeau et al. (2010). A key difference was that we increased 
the number of traits from 20 to 80 per condition to adapt the paradigm to EEG. 
 
2.2.1 Stimuli. We retrieved a total of four-hundred words descriptive of people from 
Dumas, Johnson, & Lynch (2002). From this database, we also retrieved the words’ frequency of 
occurrence in texts (Kučera & Francis, 1967), as well as ratings of familiarity and likability. We 
obtained valence ratings of the words or their root word (e.g., snob for snobbish) from Warriner, 
Kuperman, & Brysbaert (2013), when available. Words with a mean valence score below five 
and a mean score above five were classified as negative and positive, respectively. Five is the 
neutral point on the self-assessment manikins (Bradley & Lang, 1994), and Warriner et al. 
(2013) reversed the scale, thus words below 5 were negative, and words above 5 were positive. 
We excluded the words we judged as ambiguous because their scores were too close to 5, that is, 
the neutral point [e.g. “nonchalant” (M = 4.58) and “conservative” (M = 4.55)]. 48 of the 400 
words were absent from Warriner et al.'s (2013) database and thus we relied on their definition 
(Cambridge Dictionary, 2015) and likableness scores to classify them as either positive or 
negative (likeableness and valence are highly correlated; r = .931 in our selection). We generated 
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six lists of 80 words each (40 positive, 40 negative): two lists for the episodic memory condition 
(target words that were already encountered during the experiment, and new words), one for 
semantic memory, and one for each of the three self-knowledge conditions. The list of target 
words for the episodic memory task was formed by randomly selecting 10 positive and 10 
negative words from each of the semantic memory and self-knowledge lists. We distributed the 
original words randomly across the other lists using the randomization excel function and made 
adjustments as necessary to match lists in word length (i.e. number of letters), familiarity, the 
words’ frequency (Kučera & Francis, 1967), and likableness (all p ≥ .77; lowest p value obtained 
with the target words for the recognition memory task included or excluded from the analyses). 
We also rotated three lists between the three self-knowledge tasks (past, present, future) to obtain 
six combinations randomized across participants, further reducing the likelihood of a spurious 
difference between time perspectives. Negative words had significantly lower likableness scores 
compared to positive words in all lists (p < .001).  Valence and likableness were strongly 
correlated (r = .931, p < .001), and 48 words did not have valence values in the norms that we 
used (Warriner et al., 2013), thus these analyses focused on the latter. 
 
2.2.2. Experimental Conditions. During the task, participants were shown character traits 
and they were asked to make decisions about them in five ways. In the “self-knowledge” tasks, 
participants decided whether the word reflected either past (five years ago), present or future 
(five years from now) character traits. Five years was modeled on D’Argembeau et al. (2010) 
who argued that young university students had undergone – and then will undergo – significant 
changes in life circumstances during that time period. Indeed, a sense of continuity of one’s own 
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traits diminishes gradually through time, but changes temper down between 5 to 10 years for 
young adults (that is, the effect is not proportional with time; Rutt & Löckenhoff, 2016).  
In the semantic memory task, participants determined whether the word reflected the 
character traits of most people holding an occupation (i.e. soldiers, priests, lawyers, scientists). 
Some traits are easier to associate with occupations. For instance, it is easy to agree that a priest 
is “solemn”, but the same trait would be surprising (and disappointing) in a clown. The traits 
were assigned to occupations purposefully to ensure traits would vary in relevance, much like the 
relevance of traits in the self-knowledge task would (see stimuli in Appendix A). Nine additional 
people, who did not participate in the EEG study, completed a survey on Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 
Provo, UT) to verify whether traits were associated with the occupations using a 7-point Likert 
scale (1 = not at all associated, and 7 = highly associated). Responses 1 to 3 were grouped as 
“not associated” and responses 5 to 7 were considered to be “associated”. We classified words as 
either associated or not associated when 6 out of 9 people made responses at the same end of the 
spectrum. 47.5% of the traits were not associated with the occupations (26.25% negative traits, 
21.25% positive), 30% were associated with occupations (7.5% negative, 22.5% positive), and 
22.5% received mixed responses (16.25% negative, 6.25% positive). For example, when 
speaking of scientists, “inventive” was thought to be associated, “social” not associated, and 
responses were mixed for “humorous”. After the self-knowledge and semantic memory tasks, 
participants completed a recognition memory task. In that case, participants indicated whether 
the words were presented previously (i.e. target words) or if they were new (80 old, 80 new), and 
how confident they were in their response. 
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2.2.3. Procedure. Participants sat in front of a computer screen placed about 1 m from 
their eyes. During cap preparation, the researchers interviewed participants about their life 
circumstances five years ago, five years from now, and in the present, in this order (adapted from 
D’Argembeau et al., 2010). The aim of the interview was to allow participants to elaborate past, 
present, and future life circumstances prior to the task, and to reduce the likelihood of order 
effects (Cordonnier, Barnier, & Sutton, 2016), and potential discrepancies in cognitive demand 
between experimental conditions (Weiler et al., 2011) . The semi-structured interview centered 
on activities (e.g. school, leisure), geographical location and housing. The same topics were 
addressed in the three time perspectives. Presumably, our participants kept life circumstances in 
mind when judging whether traits were relevant to a specific life period, but we did not instruct 
them to do so (unlike D’Argembeau et al., 2010). We reasoned that inviting participants to think 
of life events during the task could bias self-knowledge towards appearing closer to episodic 
rather than semantic memory.  
E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) was used for stimulus 
presentation. The five experimental conditions (semantic memory, episodic memory, and past, 
present, future self-knowledge) were presented in blocks (i.e. all stimuli for a condition presented 
together), so participants could maintain a specific mode of processing when judging the traits. 
To reduce switching between modes of processing, we also presented randomly semantic 
memory either before or after the self-knowledge tasks. Following a similar logic, all the traits 
for a given occupation were presented in a block.  The order of the occupations was randomized 
in E-Prime. The 3 self-knowledge tasks could take 3 orders using the Latin Square method. The 
3 orders of the self-knowledge tasks were crossed with the 6 possible combinations of 3 lists 
with the 3 time perspectives, yielding a total of 18 versions of the task. The assignation of the 
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versions was randomized for the first set of 18 participants, and this order was repeated for the 
second set. We chose that strategy because most women were recruited in the first half of study 
inadvertently, and men in the second half. The recognition memory task always ended the study. 
Finally, the order of the traits was randomized within each block using an E-Prime function. 
Participants took short breaks between the blocks as necessary. 
 
Figure. 2. The structure of A) the self-knowledge and general semantics tasks, and B) the 
recognition memory task. In A), an additional instruction screen was included to specify an 
occupation every 20 trials for the general semantics task (surrounded by dotted lines).  
As a general rule, each trial started with a fixation cross of a variable duration (1500 to 
2000 ms), after which a trait was shown for 2000 ms (see Figure 2). The maximum response 
time was 3000 ms, during which people could press 1 or 2 to respond. A “1” signified “I think 
the word reflects my (past/ present/ future) traits” and “2” meant “I think the word does not 
reflect my (past/present/future) traits”.  Similarly, in the semantic memory task, a “1” 
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represented agreement with the statement “I think the word reflects the traits of most people 
holding the occupation”, and a “2” showed a disagreement. A white screen followed the trait 
screen for 200 ms, and this sequence of events ended with a blink screen for 1000 ms (inviting 
participants to blink).  
We adapted the stimulus presentation of the semantic and episodic memory tasks in a few 
ways. In the case of semantic memory, additional instructions were shown every 20 trials to 
specify in relation to what occupation the judgements on traits should be made. These 
instructions, like those introducing each task, were self-paced. The differences in the episodic 
memory task lay in the response screens. The options for the recognition memory task (i.e. 1 = 
old, 2 = new) were displayed after the trait screen. Subsequently, participants were shown the 
options for the confidence rating (1 = Quite sure; 2 = Relatively sure; 3 = Not sure; based on 
Renoult et al., 2015). For both the old/new and the confidence screens, participants had up to 
3000 ms to respond. A response ended the screen and triggered the onset of the next screen. 
Participants could blink when making the responses in this case, thus we did not include a 
“blink” screen during the recognition memory task.  
 
2.3 EEG acquisition and pre-processing 
The Electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded with a 63-channel active electrode 
system (Brain Products GmbH) embedded in a nylon cap (10/10 system extended). An additional 
electrode was placed under the left eye in order to monitor vertical eye movements (lower EOG). 
The continuous EEG signal was acquired at a 500 Hz sampling rate using an FCz reference. The 
high filter was set at 250 Hz and the time constant was 10 s. The impedance was kept below 20 
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kΩ. A vertical EOG was reconstructed offline as the difference between the lower EOG and FP1 
activity. A horizontal EOG was constructed by subtracting FT9 from FT10 activity.  
Offline analyses were conducted using Brain Vision Analyzer 2.1. Manual visual 
inspection was performed to remove excessive movement artifacts or drifts. High and low band-
pass filter half-amplitude cutoffs were set at 0.01 and 30 Hz (12 db/oct), respectively. We 
removed components representing eye movement and blinks with an automatic ICA ocular 
correction (Jung et al., 2000). Noisy channels were interpolated using spherical interpolation. An 
average reference was computed offline and used for all analyses. The EEG was segmented into 
epochs of 1 s (from -200 ms prior to, to 800 ms after the onset of the words). Trials were rejected 
after a 200 ms baseline correction: 1) if the absolute difference of two contiguous sampling 
points was larger than 75 µV, 2) if the difference between the minimal and maximal voltage was 
larger than 150 µV within a 200 ms interval, 3) if the voltage was above 100 µV or below -100 
µV, or 4) if the difference between the minimum and maximum voltage was less than 0.5 µV for 
100 ms.  
The percentage of rejected trials followed by a yes/no response was: Semantic Memory: 
Yes M =7.08 % ± 1.68 SE/ No M = 6.87% ± 1.65 SE; Past self-knowledge: Yes M = 5.67% ± 1.02 
SE / No M = 5.64% ± 1.32 SE; Present self-knowledge: Yes M = 4.57% ± 0.93 SE/ No M = 
4.18% ± 0.86 SE; Future self-knowledge: Yes M = 5.56% ± 1.18 SE/ No M = 6.7% ± 1.36 SE; 
Episodic Memory: (high confidence hits) M = 3.34% ± 0.69 SE/ (correct rejections) M = 3.49% 
± 0.67 SE. This resulted in the following average number of trials: Semantic Memory: Yes M = 
30.25 ± 1.23 SE/ No M = 40.25 ± 1.27 SE; Past self-knowledge: Yes M = 33.04 ± 1.19 SE/ No M 
= 39.68 ± 1.36 SE; Present self-knowledge: Yes M = 33.96 ± 1.39 SE/ No M = 39.57 ± 1.42 SE; 
Future self-knowledge: Yes M = 33.21 ± 1.05 SE/ No M = 39.75 ± 1.19 SE; Episodic Memory: 
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(high confidence hits) M = 45.71 ± 2.4 SE/ (correct rejections) M = 50.39 ± 1.79 SE. The small 
difference in the number of trials does not affect our analyses, because mean amplitude is little 
influenced by noise (Tavakoli & Campbell, 2015). 
The amplitudes of the N400 and the LPC were measured as the mean of all data points 
between 250 to 500 ms and 500 to 800 ms, respectively. The N400 is typically studied at sagittal 
or parasagittal sites, and the LPC at the posterior parietal sites. The sagittal subset included the 
electrodes FCz, Cz, CPz, and PZ, the parasagittal subset included C1/C2, C3/C4, Cp3/Cp4, and 
the posterior parietal subset included P1/2, P3/4, and PO3/4 (see Figure 3). Our key hypotheses 
and core analyses focus on the N400 and LPC at their typical maximal sites (see Table 1, and 
sections 3.1.2, 3.1.3 below). Moreover, we included frontal sites in preliminary and exploratory 
analyses for comparability with our other ERP studies on personal semantics (Renoult et al., 
2015, 2016). The frontal subset included the electrodes F1/F2, F3/F4, FC3/FC4. A visual 
inspection of the grand average ERPs upon suggestion by a reviewer (see Figure 4) prompted the 
addition of an earlier time window, because a P200 effect of memory type may precede the N400 
effect. The P200 time window was defined as ranging from 150 to 250 ms, and studied over all 
regions of interest, as P200 effects often have an anterior and central distribution, but posterior 
effects are also observed (Luck & Kappenman, 2012).  
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Figure 3. Circles surround the frontal, sagittal, parasagittal, and posterior parietal region 
of interests (ROI).  
 
2.4 Statistical analyses 
We ran repeated-measures ANOVAs on behavioral and electrophysiological data. Only 
“yes” responses were retained for these ERP analyses as these suggest participants were 
sufficiently confident in the presence of a memory trace. Further, we operationalized episodic 
memory as correct recognition of old items with high confidence (Rugg & Curran, 2007). 
Daselaar, Fleck, and Cabeza (2006), and Yonelinas (2002) consider that high confidence hits 
derive from recollection.  
The Greenhouse & Geisser (1959) procedure was used to compensate for violations of 
the sphericity assumption, when appropriate. In this case, the original degrees of freedom are 
reported together with the epsilon (E) and the corrected probability level.  
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For both behavioral and ERP data, partial eta-squared ( ) is indicated as a measure of 
effect size. 
3. Results 
3.1 Electrophysiological Data: Core Analyses 
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Figure 4. Grand average ERPs (N = 28) of yes responses for semantic memory and personal 
semantics, and high confidence hits for episodic memory, over A) frontal, B) parasagittal, C) 
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sagittal, and C) posterior parietal sites. Negative voltage is plotted upwards. A low pass filter of 
20hz was applied on the grand averages. 
 
3.1.1 P200 time window (150-250 ms) 
We tested whether a difference between the 5 memory types (semantic memory, past 
self-knowledge, present self-knowledge, future self-knowledge, and episodic memory) emerged 
early, prior to the onset of the N400. The P200 scalp maps (episodic memory subtracted from 
semantic memory and self-knowledge subtracted from semantic memory) showed a large 
distribution on central sites extending to frontal and posterior parietal sites (see Figure 5). We 
conducted separate repeated-measures ANOVA for frontal, sagittal, parasagittal, and posterior 
parietal subsets (see Figure 4), with Electrode as a factor for all subsets, and Hemisphere as an 
additional factor for the frontal, parasagittal and posterior parietal subsets. The main effect of 
Memory was not significant at the frontal subset, F(4, 108) = 1.03, p = .395, = .04, nor the 
sagittal subset, F(3.12, 84.22) = 2.14, p = .098, = .07, or the posterior parietal subset, F(2.78, 
75.16) = 1.05, p = .373, = .04. The main effect of Memory interacted with electrodes at the 
posterior parietal subset, F(3.22, 87) = 3 = p = .032,  = 1. Follow-up analyses showed the 
Memory effect was nearly significant at P2, F(4, 108) = 2.37, p = .057,  = .08, and no other 
sites were significant. Present self-knowledge had the maximal positive amplitude at the 
electrode P2.  
The main effect of Memory was significant at the parasagittal subset, F(2.89, 77.95) = 
3.59, p = .019, = .12. Semantic memory was less positive than present self-knowledge, p = 
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.012, future self-knowledge, p = .001, and episodic memory, p <.001, but not past self-
knowledge, p = .07. The main effect of Memory was only a statistical trend over the sagittal site 
(p = .098). However, it is worth noting that post-hoc tests also revealed a less positive mean 
amplitude for semantic memory compared to all other memory types, p ≤ .048. No other of the 
two-way interactions between Memory and Electrode or Memory and Hemisphere, or three-way 
interactions, were significant.  
 
Figure 5. Spline interpolated isovoltage maps of semantic memory (SM, yes responses) 
minus high confidence hits (EM) at the left, and semantic memory (SM, yes responses) minus 
the average of all self-knowledge conditions (SK; yes responses) at the right from 150 to 250 ms. 
Scalp maps were prepared in EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). 
 
3.1.2 N400 time window (250-500 ms). We examined whether the 5 memory types had a 
different mean voltage amplitude over the sagittal and parasagittal subsets as outlined in Table 1 
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(see Figure 4 panel A & B, and Figure 6). The N400 scalp maps (episodic memory subtracted 
from semantic memory and self-knowledge subtracted from semantic memory) showed a classic 
centro-parietal N400 distribution (see Figure 6). The main effect of Memory was significant, 
F(4, 108) = 2.8, p = .029,  = .09 over the sagittal subset. Semantic memory produced more 
negative amplitudes compared to all other memory conditions (past self-knowledge, p = .033,  
= .16; present self-knowledge, p = .015, = .2; future self-knowledge, p = .007,  = .24; 
episodic memory, p = .009, = .23; see Table 2). The main effect of Memory type was not 
significant over the parasagittal subsets, F(2.52, 67.93) = 1.8, p = .162,  = .06. At both sagittal 
and parasagittal sites, Memory did not interact with other factors [sagittal: Memory and 
Electrodes: F(7.11, 192) = 1.03, p = .413,  = .04; parasagittal: Memory and Electrodes: F(5.1, 
137.61) = 1.07, p = .388,  = .04; Memory and hemisphere: F(4,108) = .74, p = .567,  = .03; 
Memory, electrodes and hemisphere: F(5.28, 142.46) = .73, p = .612,  = .03]. 
The P200 may have contributed to the N400 effect. Semantic memory was less positive 
compared to other memory types from 150 to 250 ms, this effect being statistically significant at 
the parasagittal site, and a statistical trend at the sagittal site. We adopted a peak-to-peak 
approach to compare the N400 between memory types while taking into account the preceding 
P200 amplitude. The data was filtered a second time with a low pass cut-off of 10 hz (12 db/oct) 
allowing clear peaks to emerge. We selected the maximal positive peak from 150 to 250 ms 
(P200) and the maximal negative peak from 250 to 500 ms (N400), using the Analyzer software. 
We then subtracted the N400 voltage from the P200 voltage and entered this peak-to-peak 
measurement in a repeated measures ANOVA including the 5 memory types and the 4 electrodes 
of the sagittal site (where the N400 effect of Memory was significant with the mean amplitude 
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data). The main effect of Memory was non-significant, F(4, 108) = .23, p = .922,  = .01, nor 
was the Memory and Electrode interaction, F(6.07, 163.79) = 1.03, p = .422,  = .04. This 
analysis thus revealed that the N400 effect cannot be dissociated from the preceding P200 effect 
at these electrode sites. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Spline interpolated isovoltage maps of semantic memory (SM) minus episodic memory 
(EM; left) and semantic memory (SM) minus the average of all self-knowledge conditions (SK; 
right) from 250 to 500 ms. Scalp maps were prepared in EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). 
 
Table 2: Comparisons between memory types over the sagittal subset in the N400 time window.	
Multiple Comparisons 
Dir. SM vs Past SK  Dir. SM vs Present SK  Dir. SM vs Future SK 
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> F(1,27) = 5.07, p = 
.033,  = .16 
 > F(1,27) = 6.75, p = 
.015,  = .2 
 > F(1,27) = 8.68, p = 
.007,  = .24 
        
Dir. EM vs Past SK  Dir. EM vs Present SK  Dir. EM vs Future SK 
        
ns F(1,27) = .01, p = .939, 
 < .01 
 ns F(1,27) = .58, p = 
.452,  = .02 
 ns F(1,27) = .42, p = 
.521,  = .02 
        
Dir. Past SK vs Present SK  Dir. Past SK vs Future 
SK  
 Dir. Present vs Future SK 
        
ns F(1,27) = .54, p = .468, 
 = .02 
 ns F(1,27) = .3, p = 
.588,  = .01 
 ns F(1,27) = .01, p = .95, 
 < .01 
        
Dir. SM vs EM*       
        
> F(1,27) = 7.94, p = 
.009,  = .23 
      
        
Note: > = “more negative”; < = “less negative”, ns = non-significant. *Two-way interaction 
between memory and electrodes. SK = self-knowledge, SM = semantic memory. 
 
3.1.3 LPC time window (500-800 ms). We tested whether the 5 memory types have a 
different mean voltage amplitude over the posterior parietal sites (see Table 1 for the 
hypotheses). The main effect of Memory was significant, F(4, 108) = 5.19, p = .001,  = .16. 
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As can been observed in Figure 4 panel D, at one extreme, episodic memory was associated 
more positive amplitudes compared to present self-knowledge, p = .049,  = .14, and semantic 
memory, but not past self-knowledge, p = .102,  = .1, or future self-knowledge, p = .338,  = 
.03 (see Table 3). The three self-knowledge conditions were not statistically different from one 
another (past vs present: p = .719,  < .01; past vs future: , p = .292,  = .04; present vs future: 
p = .217,  = .06; see Table 3).  All personal types of memory had greater positive amplitudes 
compared to semantic memory: (past self-knowledge, p = .021, = .18; present self-knowledge, 
p = .031,  = .16, future self-knowledge, p = .001,  = .33, episodic memory, p < .001,  = 
.43). The Memory factor did not interact with Hemisphere, F(4, 108) = .75, p = .562,  = .03, 
Electrode, F(4.51, 121.71) = 1.29, p = .274, = .046, and there was no three-way interaction, 
F(4.96, 133.85) = 1, p = .422,  = .04. The LPC for episodic memory relative to semantic 
memory had a left-sided posterior parietal scalp distribution (see Figure 7). The LPC for episodic 
memory relative to present self-knowledge had a more posterior scalp distribution with maximal 
amplitudes at left posterior parietal sites, extending to parietal-occipital sites.  
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Figure 7. Spline interpolated isovoltage maps of high confidence hits (EM) minus semantic 
memory (SM; yes responses) at the left and high confidence hits (EM) minus present self-
knowledge (SK; yes responses) at the right during the 500 to 800 ms time window. Scalp maps 
were prepared in EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). 
 
Table 3: Paired comparisons between memory types over the posterior parietal subset in the 
LPC time window.	
Multiple Comparisons 
Dir. EM vs Past SK 
 
 Dir. EM vs Present SK  Dir. EM vs Future SK 
        
ns F(1,27) = 2.87, p = .102, 
 = .1 
 > F(1,27) = 4.26, p = 
.049,  = .14 
 ns F(1,27) = .95, p = 
.338,  = .03 
        
Dir. Past SK vs SM  Dir. Present SK vs SM  Dir. Future SK vs SM 
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> 
F(1,27) = 6, p = .021,  = 
.18 
 > F(1,27) = 5.16, p = 
.031,  = .16 
 > F(1,27) = 13.05, p = 
.001,  = .33 
        
Dir. Past SK vs Present SK  Dir. Past SK vs Future 
SK  
 Dir. Present vs Future SK 
        
ns 
F(1,27) = .13, p = .719,  
< .01 
 ns F(1,27) = 1.16, p = 
.292,  = .04 
 ns F(1,27) = 1.6, p = 
.217,  = .06 
        
Dir. EM vs SM       
        
> F(1,27) = 20.25, p < .001, 
 = .43 
      
        
Note: > = “more positive”; < = “less positive”; ns = non-significant.  
 
3.2 Electrophysiological Data: Manipulation Checks and Exploratory Analyses 
3.2.1 N400 time window (250-500 ms). The N400 is a well-established ERP component 
that typically displays larger negative amplitude over centroparietal sites for a semantically 
incongruent words (e.g. “I take coffee with cream and dog”) compared to a semantical congruent 
word (e.g. “I shaved off my mustache and beard”) in specific sentential or prime-target contexts 
(examples taken from Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). If we consider no responses as signifying that 
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the trait is “incongruent” with an occupation or the self-concept, its mean N400 amplitude might 
be more negative than when people respond yes.  
To test this hypothesis, we conducted separate repeated-measure ANOVAs for the 
sagittal and parasagittal subsets of electrodes with Memory condition (4 levels: semantic 
memory, past self-knowledge, present self-knowledge, future self-knowledge), Response (yes, 
no), Electrode and Hemisphere (for the parasagittal subset) as factors. We focus on the main 
effect of Response, interactions between Response and Memory, and three- or four-way 
interactions including Response, Memory as factors for these preliminary analyses. Over the 
sagittal site, no responses resulted in a more negative amplitude (M = 0.13 µV ± 0.21 SE) 
compared to yes responses (M = 0.38 µV ± 0.21 SE), F(1,27) = 5.02, p = .033,  = .16 (see 
Figure 8). The main effect of Response did not reach significance over the parasagittal sites, 
F(1,27) = 2.83, p = .104,  = .1. None of the interactions were significant, thus they are 
presented in Table 4 for simplicity. 
 
Figure 8. Grand average ERPs (N = 28) of the three self-knowledge conditions over sagittal 
sites. Negative voltage is plotted upwards. A low pass filter of 20hz was applied on the grand 
averages. 
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Table 4: Interactions between Response (yes, no) and Memory types, and other factors (i.e. 
Hemisphere, Electrode).	
Interactions with Response 
 Dir. *Mem  Dir. *Mem*Elec 
      
Sagittal Subset  F(3, 81) = 1.3, p 
= .281,  = 05 
  F(9, 243) = .82, p = 
.595,   = .03 
      
 Dir. *Mem  Dir. *Mem*Elec 
      
Para-sagittal 
Subset 
 F(3, 81) = .61, p 
= .612,  = .02 
  F(4.13, 111.53) = .49, p 
= .748,  = .02 
      
 Dir. *Mem*Hem  Dir. *Mem*Elec*Hem 
      
Para-sagittal 
Subset 
 F(3, 81) = .76, p 
= .518,   = .03 
  F(3.9, 105.47) = .92, p = 
.454,  = .03 
      
Note: ns = non-significant, Mem = memory, Hem = hemisphere, Elec = electrode. 
 
3.2.2 LPC time window (500-800 ms). Another established finding in ERP research is 
the parietal old/new effect: LPC amplitude is more positive for hits compared to correct 
rejections over posterior parietal sites (Rugg & Curran, 2007). We ran a repeated-measures 
ANOVA with Memory performance (2 levels: high confidence hits, correct rejection), 
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Hemisphere, Electrode as factors on the mean amplitude between 500 to 800 ms. As expected, 
the amplitude of hits was more positive (M = 2.71 µV ± 0.42 SE) compared to correct rejections 
(M = 2.07 µV ± 0.39 SE), F(1,27) = 16.26, p < .001,  = .38 (see Figure 9). However, the type 
of memory response did not interact with Hemisphere, F(1, 27) = .05, p = .83,   <  .01, or 
Electrodes, F(2, 54) < .01, p = .996,   <  .01, and the three-way interaction was not significant, 
F(2, 54) = .37, p = .692,  = .01. The LPC had a posterior parietal distribution, with local 
maxima at left posterior parietal sites and right centro-parietal sites (see Figure 10).  
 
Figure 9. Grand average ERPs (N = 28) of high confidence hits and correct rejections over 
posterior parietal sites. Negative voltage is plotted upwards. A low pass filter of 20hz was 
applied on the grand averages. 
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Figure 10. Spline interpolated isovoltage maps of high confidence hits minus correct rejections 
from 500 to 800 ms. Scalp maps were prepared in EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). 
 
3.2.3 Frontal ROI. We investigated the main effect of Memory over the frontal subset 
during the N400 and LPC time window (see 3.1.1 for P200). The FN400, or the midfrontal 
old/new effect, is commonly thought to index familiarity in recognition, often used as the 
counterpart to the LPC, or the parietal old/new effect, which indexes recollection (Rugg & 
Curran, 2007). 
 As preliminary check, the FN400 effect was not observed on frontal site when 
comparing high confidence hits and correct rejection, F(1, 27) = .14, p = .71,  = .01. Response 
Type did not interact with Electrode, F(2, 54) = .2, p = .816,  = .01, or Hemisphere, F(1, 27) = 
.23, p = .639,  = .01, Electrode and Hemisphere, F(2, 54) = .4, p = .673,  = .02, which are 
also included in this set of analyses. 
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Next, we considered whether the 5 memory conditions differed over frontal sites during 
the N400 time window, and they did not, F(3.39, 91.65) = .73, p = .552, = .026. Memory did 
not interact with Electrode, F(8, 216) = 1.02, p = .425, = .04, or hemisphere, F(4, 108) = .6, p 
= .667, = .02, and there was no three-way interaction, F(5.13, 138.57) = .77, p = .577, = 
.03. Lastly, we tested if the 5 memory types differed in the later time window over the frontal 
subset, that is, from 500 to 800 ms. Indeed, the main effect of Memory was significant, F(4, 108) 
= 4.73, p = .001, = .15. Episodic memory was more negative than general semantics, p = .002, 
past self-knowledge, p = .001, present self-knowledge, but not future self-knowledge, p = .084. 
Future self-knowledge was also more negative than past self-knowledge, p = .014. Memory did 
not interact with Electrode, F(8, 216) = 1.35, p = .223, = .05, or Hemisphere, F(4, 108) = .88, 
p = .481, = .03, and there was no three-way interaction, F(5.15, 139.04) = 1.14, p = .343, = 
.04. This effect is likely due to the use of the average reference, consistent with findings of 
FN400 and LPC effects of opposite polarity when using this reference (Curran & Friedman, 
2004; e.g., Curran, Tanaka, & Weiskopf, 2002; Renoult et al., 2015). 
3.3 Behavioral Data: Preliminary analyses and manipulations checks 
3.3.1 Behavioral data: Reaction Times 
We tested whether the memory conditions differ in their mean reaction times (this 
section) or responses (next section). Through these analyses, we aimed to verify if our study 
replicates previous findings of an optimism bias (D’Argembeau et al., 2010; Kanten & Teigen, 
2008; Wilson & Ross, 2001). We tested whether mean Reaction Time (RT) differed between 
Valence (2 levels: positive, negative), Response (2 levels: yes, no), and the Memory conditions 
(4 levels: semantic memory, past, present, and future self-knowledge), and whether these factors 
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interacted (see Figure 11). Participants made recognition responses after trait presentation (rather 
than during presentation) for the episodic memory condition, thus there was no reaction times to 
analyze for this condition.  
 
Figure 11. Mean RTs for positive traits (left) and negative traits (right) for yes and no 
responses in each of the memory conditions. Error bars represent ± 1 SE. 
 
The repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of Memory, F(3, 81) = 3.89, p = 
.012, = .13, and a main effect of Valence, F(1, 27) = 12.27, p = .002, = .31. Memory, 
Valence, and Response interacted, F(3, 81) = 6.98, p < .001, = .21. We ran separate repeated-
measures ANOVAs for positive and negative traits to follow-up on this three-way interaction. 
Memory and Response interacted for positive traits, F(3, 81) = 3.07, p = .032,  = .1, and 
negative traits, F(2.23, 60.14) = 3.55, p = .031,  = .12. The most important finding (given that 
we emphasized yes responses in our ERP analyses) was that, for positive traits, the main effect of 
Memory was significant, F(2.24, 60.46) = 7.86, p = .001,  = .23. Participants were faster to 
respond yes in the future self-knowledge condition compared to past self-knowledge (p < .001, 
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= .44), present self-knowledge (p = .008, = .23), and semantic memory (p < .001, = .39). 
Participants were also faster to respond yes for present compared to past self-knowledge (p = 
.046, = .14; see Table 5).  The rapidity of no responses to positive traits did not differ between 
memory conditions, F(3, 81) = .47, p = .706,  = .02. For negative traits, RTs to yes responses 
were not significantly different between memory types, F(2.2, 59.47) = 1.22, p = .305, = .04.  
However, the main effect of Memory was significant for no response to negative traits, F(2.07, 
55.9) = 6.33, p = .003,  = .19. Participants were significantly faster to respond no for future 
self-knowledge compared to past self-knowledge (p = .001, = .33), present self-knowledge (p 
= .011, = .22), and semantic memory (p = .001, = .36). Thus, participants were faster to 
endorse positive traits and reject negative traits when they pertained to the future relative to the 
past or present selves, or other people. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Comparisons of the RT between Memory types as a factor of Response (yes or no). 
 Multiple Comparisons 
Positive Traits   Negative Traits 
Response Dir. Future SK vs SM  Response Dir. Future SK vs SM 
       
Yes < F(1, 27) = 17.03, p < 
.001, = .39 
 No < 
F(1, 27) = 15.19, p = .001, 
= .36 
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Response Dir. Future SK vs Past SK  Response Dir. Future SK vs Past SK 
       
Yes < F(1, 27) = 21.38, p < 
.001, = .44  
 No < 
F(1, 27) = 12.98, p = .001, 
= .33 
       
Response Dir. Future vs Present SK  Response Dir. Future vs Present SK 
       
Yes < F(1, 27) = 8.23, p = 
.008, = .23 
 No < 
F(1, 27) = 7.38, p = .011, = 
.22 
       
Response Dir. Past SK vs Present 
SK 
 Response Dir. Past SK vs Present SK 
       
Yes > F(1, 27)  = 4.38, p = 
.046, = .14 
 No ns 
F(1, 27) = .42, p = .523, = 
.02 
       
Response Dir. SM vs Past SK  Response Dir. SM vs Past SK 
       
Yes ns F(1, 27) = .28, p = 
.605,  = .01 
 No ns 
F(1, 27) = 2.16, p = .154, = 
.07 
       
Response Dir. SM vs Present SK  Response Dir. SM vs Present SK 
       
Yes ns F(1, 27) = 3.41, p = 
.076,  = 11 
 No ns 
F(1, 27) = 2.27, p = .144, = 
.08 
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Note: > = “slower”; < = “faster”, ns = non-significant, SK = self-knowledge, SM = semantic 
memory 
  
3.3.2 Behavioral data: Percentage of Yes Responses  
We ran a repeated-measures ANOVA on the percentage of yes responses with Valence 
and Memory conditions (4 levels: semantic memory, past, present, and future self-knowledge) as 
within-subject factors. The percentage of yes responses did not differ between Memory types 
when averaging responses to positive and negative traits together, F(3,81) = 1.75, p = .164,  = 
.06 (see Figure 12).  
Figure 12. Mean percentage of yes responses for positive traits (left) and negative traits 
(right) in each of the memory conditions. Error bars represent ± 1 SE. 
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Overall, participants made a greater percentage of yes responses for positive than 
negative traits, F(1, 27) = 241.57, p < .001,  = .9. Memory types and Valence interacted, F(3, 
81) = 20.15, p < .001,  = .43. The percentage of yes responses to positive traits was higher for 
future self-knowledge compared to all other conditions (semantic memory: p < .001,  = .73; 
past self-knowledge: p < .001,  = .54; present self-knowledge: p < .001,  = .45, see Table 
6). In addition, participants endorsed a higher percentage of positive traits in present self-
knowledge relative to the positive traits they attributed to other people (semantic memory), p = 
.047,  = .14. The mirrored effect was observed for negative traits: the percentage of yes 
responses was lower for future self-knowledge compared to all others conditions (semantic 
memory: p < .001,  = .48; past self-knowledge: p < .001,  = .55; present self-knowledge: p 
< .001,  = .41).  
 
Table 6: Comparisons of the percentage of yes responses between memory types. 
Multiple Comparisons  
Positive Traits  Negative Traits 
Dir. Future SK vs SM  Dir. Future SK vs. SM 
     
> F(1, 27) = 73.78, p < .001,  = .73  < F(1, 27) = 24.44, p < .001,  = .48 
     
Dir. Future SK vs Past SK  Dir. Future SK vs Past SK 
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> F(1, 27) = 31.05, p < .001,  = .54  < F(1 ,27) = 33.29, p < .001,  = .55 
     
Dir. Future vs Present SK  Dir. Future vs Present SK 
     
> F(1, 27) = 22.48, p < .001,  = .45  < F(1, 27) = 18.59, p < .001,  = .41 
     
Dir. Past SK vs Present SK  Dir. Past SK vs Present SK 
     
ns F(1,27) = 2.24, p = .146,  = .08  ns F(1, 27) = 3.2, p = .085,  = .11 
     
Dir. SM vs Past SK  Dir. SM vs Past SK 
     
ns F(1, 27) = .16, p = .692,  = .01  ns F(1, 27) = 2.36, p = .136,  = .08 
     
Dir. SM vs Present SK  Dir. SM vs Present SK 
     
< F(1, 27) = 4.34, p = .047,  = .14  ns F(1, 27) < .01, p = .995,   < .01 
     
Note: > = “higher percentage”; < = “lower percentage”, ns = non-significant, SM = semantic 
memory, SK = self-knowledge 
 
3.3.3 Behavioral data: Recognition Memory Task 
We compared the rapidity of the correct recognition responses (2 levels: hits and correct 
rejections) with Valence as an additional factor. Participants were slower to make correct 
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rejections (M = 629.78ms ± 34.56SE) compared to hits (M = 503ms ± 23.22SE), F(1, 27) = 
25.04, p < .001,  = .48. The interaction between the response time of Response Type and 
Valence approached the level of significance, F(1,27) = 4.13, p = .052,  = .13. Participants 
were faster to make hits than correct rejections for both positive and negative words (p ≤ .001), 
however this effect seemed stronger for positive words.  The main effect of Valence was not 
significant, F(1,27) = .35, p = .56,  =.01. 
For recognition performance, we compared the percentage of correct responses between 
Response Type (2 levels: hits and correct rejections) and Valence. Participants were more 
accurate in their recognition of target words (M = 81.56 ± 1.93 SE) than new words overall (M = 
66.79 ± 2.49 SE), F(1,27) = 17.65, p < .001,  = .4. There was no effect of Valence, F(1, 27) = 
.03, p = .862,  < .01, but Memory and Valence interacted, F(1,27) = 23.62, p < .001,  = .47. 
Participants produced more hits when traits were positive (M = 83.93% ± 2.02 SE) than when 
they were negative (M = 79.2% ± 2.1SE), F(1, 27) = 10.89, p = .003,  = .29. Conversely, 
participants were more accurate to reject new items when traits where negative (M = 69.38% ± 
2.5 SE) than positive (M = 64.2% ± 2.78 SE), F(1, 27) = 8.28, p =.008,  = .24. Next, we 
considered whether differences between positive and negative traits were attributable to a change 
in sensitivity (d’) or to a bias towards a certain response (c). Positive and negative traits did not 
differ in sensitivity, F(1, 27) = .35, p = .56,  = .01. Participants were significantly more biased 
towards a yes response for positive traits (M = -.37 ± .07 SE) than they were for negative traits 
(M = -.14 ± .06 SE), F(1, 27) = 28.68, p < .001,  = .52. 
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4. Discussion 
The goal of the present study was to compare the event-related potential (ERP) correlates 
of self-knowledge to both semantic and episodic memory, focusing on N400 and LPC as proxies 
for semantic and episodic processing, respectively. We also considered time perspective of the 
self-knowledge judgements (past, present, and future), because thinking about one’s past and 
future selves may engage semantic and episodic memory to differing degrees (Irish & Piguet, 
2013; Prebble et al., 2013). 
Behavioral results revealed that participants endorsed more positive traits and fewer 
negative traits as reflecting their future selves, and did so faster, compared to their past and 
present selves (D’Argembeau et al., 2010; Wilson & Ross, 2001). The participants also rated 
themselves as “better-than-average”: Their own current and future personalities were perceived 
as containing more positive traits than other people’s personalities (similar to: Kanten and 
Teigen (2008)). 
ERP results indicated that mean N400 amplitude at sagittal sites was larger for semantic 
memory than for all time perspectives of self-knowledge (note also that, as one might expect 
from the literature (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011), the no responses on the self-knowledge and 
semantic memory tasks were associated with a larger N400 compared to yes responses). Of note, 
we found a larger P200 for self-knowledge conditions relative to semantic memory at these same 
electrode sites. The N400 memory effect was in tandem with the preceding P200, thus the N400 
effect may not be solely attributable to a difference in semantic processing (see 4.3 for a 
discussion of this finding). Also commensurate with the existing literature, on the recognition 
memory task the LPC was larger for high confidence hits compared to correct rejections at 
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posterior parietal sites. On the self-knowledge task, the amplitude of the LPC associated with 
knowing one’s current self fell intermediately between semantic and episodic memory, whereas 
the LPC for knowledge of past and future selves was closer to episodic memory. This 
modulation of the time perspective is noteworthy in that it is related to only a slight variation in 
the instructions (i.e. past vs. present vs. future).  
 
4.1 Time perspective and Self-knowledge 
Some have considered that temporally distant selves are similar to other people (e.g. 
Pronin & Ross, 2006). Using a similar logic, D’Argembeau et al. (2010) reported that the  
neurocognitive processes involved in thinking about distant past or the future selves relative to 
the present self shares similarities with thinking of other people. Knowledge of unknown or a 
generic group of people belongs to the domain of semantic memory (Binder & Desai, 2011; 
Lambon Ralph et al., 2017), thus such perspectives and findings can be gathered as further 
support that past and future self-knowledge recruits semantic processing. Our study shows the 
value of including conditions of semantic and episodic memory rather than extrapolating 
relationships solely on the basis of neural correlates associated with semantic and episodic 
memory (and the self). Regarding the N400, we had considered the possibility of a closer 
relationship between semantic memory and present self-knowledge because of their conceptual 
similarity. This expectation was based on the idea that present self-knowledge implies awareness 
in the present, like semantic memory. Moreover, present self-knowledge might reflect mostly 
stable (atemporal) characteristics of one’s personality (Anusic & Schimmack, 2016). A recent 
meta-analysis estimated the stable portion of our personality to be 83% (at M age = 32 years 
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old; Anusic & Schimmack, 2016). Likewise, semantic memory is conceptualized as devoid of 
temporal context. Contrary to these expectations, we found that time perspective did not 
modulate the N400. In fact, when considering the P200/N400 and LPC, the current study 
suggests that present self-knowledge shares greater similarity with past and future self-
knowledge than with semantic memory. As D’Argembeau et al. (2008) pointed out, the qualifier 
“present” in “present” self-knowledge might instead refer to an extended period (e.g. as a life 
chapter or “repeated/general” events). In addition, personality can change with context (Roberts, 
2007), even within a single life period. Most participants in the present study were university 
students and the experimental context (i.e. at the University) might have reinstated the relevance 
of that context for the current self-identity (e.g. I am calm as a student, but wild when with 
friends). Awareness of oneself through different temporal contexts is a hallmark of episodic 
memory (Tulving, 2001, 2002). To investigate the neural correlates of the stable/atemporal 
aspects of self-knowledge, the instructions in a future study could insist on participants’ 
processing the words according to whether they reflect stable characteristics of one’s personality 
(e.g. I have always been independent).  
The mean LPC of past and future self-knowledge was less positive than, but not 
significantly different from, episodic memory. The LPC is associated with recollection, and 
possibly also with self-relevance (Fields & Kuperberg, 2016; Rugg & Curran, 2007, Renoult et 
al., 2015). The trials from the three self-knowledge conditions were all judged to be self-relevant 
by our participants (i.e., we focused on the “yes” trials in the ERP analyses), therefore the LPC 
difference is unlikely to be explained by this factor. However, it will be interesting to 
disambiguate how self-relevance, demands on scene construction, and/or mental time travel 
(Palombo et al., in press) may each contribute to LPC differences across past, present, and future 
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time perspectives. Alternatively, our findings suggest that self-knowledge could be 
conceptualized as falling on a continuum ranging from “experience-near” (e.g. I was very 
friendly as a salesperson) to the “experience-far” (e.g. I am always a cheerful person; Grilli & 
Verfaellie, 2016; Renoult et al., 2016). This distinction has proven to be useful for 
autobiographical facts, another type of personal semantics. For example, amnesic patients are 
more impaired when autobiographical facts are judged to be close to experience (e.g. I adopted 
my cat in a shelter in Ottawa) than they are for facts removed from experience (e.g. I speak 
French; Grilli & Verfaellie, 2016). Self-knowledge might similarly be organized in an 
experience-near versus experience-far manner. 
On the basis of the self-construal account we can deduce that the requirements in 
semantic processing (i.e. the N400) of past and future self-knowledge will be closer to general 
semantics than to present self-knowledge, because distant events include more general facts and 
less episodic details (Trope & Liberman, 2010). If we extend this logic, past and future self-
knowledge may require accessing general knowledge about typical life narratives and changes in 
personality to a greater extent than present self-knowledge. Temporal orientation of self-
knowledge did not modulate the N400, contrary to this interpretation of the self-construal 
account. The alternative account highlights the role of events to define identity, as well as the 
close interrelationships between past or future thinking and episodic memory.  This last account 
offers a better fit for our findings: the LPC of past and future self-knowledge was not 
significantly different from episodic memory, while present self-knowledge was intermediate, 
and differed from semantic and episodic memory. Our results support the perspective that 
recollection or simulation of personal events shape self-knowledge for all temporal orientation, 
although knowledge of past and future selves increases demands on episodic processing. This 
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pattern of results for the LPC, with past and future self-knowledge being less similar to semantic 
memory relative to present self-knowledge was not mirrored in the N400. The N400 and LPC 
thus showed distinct modulations by time perspective and memory types. Time perspective 
produced a strong LPC effect, but weak (or absent) N400 effect. Similarly, in one of our 
previous studies, the LPC, but not the N400, distinguished high autobiographically significant 
concepts from concepts with low autobiographical significance (Renoult et al., 2015).  
 
4.2 Self-knowledge and Other Types of Personal Semantics 
Personal semantics have been argued by Renoult et al. (2012) to come in 4 types, all of 
which fall between semantic and episodic memory as “intermediate types of declarative 
memory”, but are their neural and behavioral correlates all “intermediate” in the same way? The 
Renoult et al. (2012) review of the existing literature suggested that the answer is “no;” two of 
the 4 types of personal semantics (i.e., memory for repeated events, and autobiographically 
significant concepts) may be closer to episodic memory, one type (i.e., autobiographical facts) 
may be closer to semantic memory, and the last type (i.e. self-knowledge; see Figure 1; Renoult 
et al., 2012) may be relatively distinct from both – although as seen in the present paper self-
knowledge’s relation to semantic and episodic memory appears to vary as a function of time 
perspective. Yet, the question of how similar or dissimilar these 4 different types of personal 
semantics are to one another can only be answered tentatively at present, because most types of 
personal semantics have not been compared to one another, or to the same kind of semantic and 
episodic memory “control” conditions, within the same study. The ERP correlates of personal 
semantics appear to vary. For instance, a first study (Renoult et al., 2015) compared the ERP 
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correlates of concepts from a single experimental condition by sorting them according to whether 
the concepts had high or low autobiographical significance (self-reported by each participant 
after the task). High autobiographically significant (AS) concepts were theorized to be personal 
semantics, whereas low autobiographical significance concepts were taken to predominantly 
reflect semantic memory. The N400 was not significantly different between these two kinds of 
concepts, but the mean LPC was more positive for the highly autobiographically significant 
concepts than for the less-autobiographically significant ones. Conversely, in a separate study on 
two other kinds of personal semantics – namely, autobiographical facts and memory for repeated 
events (Renoult et al., 2016) -- the N400 for autobiographical facts (e.g. I am vegetarian) and for 
repeated events (e.g. I remember cleaning the windows every spring) was less negative than for 
general facts at sagittal and posterior parietal sites. Other findings appear to be more consistent 
across various subtypes of personal semantics in this nascent literature. Across several recent 
publications, all types of personal semantics were associated with larger LPC amplitudes than 
semantic memory (Coronel & Federmeier, 2016; Renoult et al., 2015, 2016). In contrast, in the 
Renoult et al. (2016) report, autobiographical facts and repeated events were less distinguishable 
from episodic memory, similar to our findings in the present study regarding future and past self-
knowledge (Renoult et al., 2016). The effect sizes that we have reported here can be used to 
generate the hypothesis that past self-knowledge (  = .03) and future self-knowledge (  = .1) 
are less different from episodic memory than are autobiographical facts (  = .18), memory for 
repeated events ( = .26), and present self-knowledge (  =.14). A unique characteristic of 
self-knowledge as compared to other types of personal semantics may be modulation of the 
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P200, as such modulation was not observed for memories of autobiographical facts, repeated 
events or for autobiographically significant concepts (Renoult et al., 2015, 2016).
1
  
A main interest of Coronel and Federmeier (2016) and Choi et al. (2017) was to 
investigate the characteristics of the incongruency effect of personal semantics, if at all present 
(i.e. larger N400 for a word incongruent with its context vs. congruent). These researchers 
collected personal information prior to the experimental tasks to elaborate the stimuli, unlike 
Renoult et al. (2015; 2016), and this study. Thus, the statements were either consistent or 
inconsistent with the facts or the preferences the participants had shared. The N400 was larger 
for statements conflicting with one’s preferences (i.e. self-knowledge) and for false 
autobiographical facts compared to congruent statements. Likewise, in our study, no responses, 
signifying that traits do not reflect oneself or other people, were associated with a larger N400 
than yes responses at sagittal sites. The effect did not interact with memory type (i.e. personal 
																																								 																				
1
	In other studies of this group the mean N400 was extracted 300-500 ms post-stimulus 
onset including centro-parietal sites, and the mean LPC was extracted from 500 to 700 ms post-
stimulus onset, including posterior parietal sites. We selected a time window of 250 to 500 ms in 
this study. Each offers a comparable outcome. That is, when using a 300 to 500 ms time window, 
the main effect of Memory was significant over the sagittal site, F(4, 108) = 2.61, p = .039, = 
.09, and it was not significant over the parasagittal site, F(2.58, 69.75) = 1.62, p = .198, = .06.  
Pairwise comparisons showed that semantic memory was more negative compared to all other 
memory conditions over the sagittal site (past self-knowledge, p = .04; present self-knowledge, p 
= .023; future self-knowledge, p =.01; episodic memory, p = .04). All these effects were also 
significant from 250 to 500 ms, and no other effects were significant.	
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semantics versus semantic memory). Visual inspection of the data suggests that the effect only 
became evident when all memory conditions were considered together, and the effect was not 
significant at parasagittal sites. Contrary to Choi et al. (2017), and Coronel and Federmeier 
(2016), the stimuli in our personal semantics and semantic memory tasks do not possess a truth 
or false value per se. Rather, traits are likely to range on a continuum of how well they match 
one’s personality or other people’s personality (e.g. I have a moderate sense of humour, priests 
have a moderate sense of humour). Future studies could record responses on a scale from the 
completely congruent to the completely incongruent (instead of the dichotomous yes/no 
response) to investigate how the level of agreement modulates the N400.   
 
4.3 Future Directions 
We found that the amplitude of the P200 was less positive for semantic memory than for 
the other conditions. The P200 is sometimes thought to index high order perceptual processes, as 
in visual feature analysis (Evans & Federmeier, 2007; Luck & Hillyard, 1994). However, we do 
not think that differences due to selective attention to visual features are likely to explain any 
P200 effects in our study. Indeed, our stimuli were matched in number of letters, frequency, 
familiarity, and likableness (similar to emotional valence). Moreover, stimulus presentation was 
identical across conditions (i.e. same duration, font, colour, location on the screen), and a similar 
yes/no response was required in all conditions. Interestingly, a large body of research links P200 
to emotion via its possible effects on attention or early lexico-semantic processing (Hajcak, 
Weinberg, MacNamara, & Foti, 2012; Kotz & Paulmann, 2011; Trauer, Kotz, & Müller, 2015). 
In these studies, the P200 is larger for emotional than neutral stimuli (Carretié, Hinojosa, Martín-
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Loeches, Mercado, & Tapia, 2004; Kanske & Kotz, 2007; Kotz & Paulmann, 2011). Even 
though the stimuli of our memory conditions were matched in likableness (or emotional 
valence), thinking about the words in relation to oneself may have increased their emotional 
salience compared to thinking about a group of people. Our findings would thus be reminiscent 
of those of Trauer et al., (2015) who interpreted their larger P200 and smaller N400 for 
emotional words compared to neutral words as “enhanced lexico-meaning access” (P200) and 
“facilitate[d] (….) integrative semantic processing”. Other studies have found a larger P200 but 
smaller N400 for positive compared to neutral words (Kanske & Kotz, 2007) and smaller N400 
for positive words about self relative to positive words about others (Fields & Kuperberg, 2015). 
Fields and Kuperberg (2015) interpreted their findings in the context of a positivity bias: the 
attribution of a positive outcome is more expected for oneself than for others, and we could add 
that it requires less semantic processing for oneself. Indeed, our “yes” responses include mostly 
positive words from each condition, and a positivity bias is observed in the behavioural data. The 
component process view of personal semantics proposes, among other things, that emotional 
valence would be increased for self-knowledge relative to semantic memory (Renoult et al., 
2012). Therefore, processing words in relation to one’s self rather than in relation to others might 
increase the emotional salience of the words in a way that transpires in the P200 (possibly via 
attentional processes). 
It is worth noting that there may be qualitative gaps when comparing personal with 
general semantics, as typically operationalized. Self-knowledge is often more emotional than 
general knowledge (Renoult et al., 2012; Sui & Humphreys, 2015). Similarly, a general 
semantics judgement may be less specific or may rely on a smaller amount of information that a 
self-judgement (e.g., I know what the word student means versus I know that I am a student; 
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Klein & Loftus, 1993). Moreover, general semantics is very often looked at with typicality 
judgements of culturally-shared knowledge (what most people think/do, what is true in general, 
as in semantic categorisation tasks); this by definition concerns a group, whereas the self by 
definition is specific to one individual. To try to circumvent these problems, one might consider 
instead contrasting knowledge of just one individual (e.g., a close family member) with self-
knowledge, but the former would not be a typical semantic memory condition because semantic 
memory is most often defined as general, culturally-shared knowledge (and, thus, detailed 
knowledge of a close other may be instead another type of personal semantics; Binder & Desai, 
2011; Hart et al., 2007; Martin, 2001). For these reasons, when we compared personal to general 
semantics, we chose to contrast judgements of one’s own traits to judgements of a category of 
people. Nonetheless, because of these potential qualitative gaps between typical 
operationalizations of personal and general semantics, it will be worthwhile in future studies to 
study some of these factors further (e.g., investigate how emotional semantic knowledge 
compares to self-knowledge; compare the neural substrates of knowledge of groups to 
knowledge of individuals, etc.).  
It is also important to note that, in the present study, episodic memory was 
operationalized as high confidence recognition memory hits (Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 
2007) and not as rich episodic re-experiencing, as is commonly done in autobiographical 
memory studies (Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007). This is because such slow re-experiencing 
recollection experiences are typically associated with complex task demands and longer 
processing time (e.g., 5-10 s per trial, Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, Whitecross, & Sharpe, 2002; 
Svoboda, McKinnon, & Levine, 2006) as compared to semantic memory tasks (0.8-1.5s, 
Chang, 1986). High confidence recognition memory is thus a better comparison in this context 
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as it relies on more comparable task demands (Renoult et al., 2016), yet is thought to derive 
from recollection (Daselaar, 2006; Diana & Ranganath, 2011; Yonelinas, 2002b). The present 
episodic memory condition may rely to a greater extent on the 1st recollection stage of the 
model of Moscovitch (2008), reflecting fast ecphory (i.e., automatic interaction between the 
word cue and a corresponding memory trace) than on the second stage reflecting conscious 
and effortful re-experiencing. It would be interesting in future studies to develop complex 
semantic memory tasks that could be used as comparison for these slower and more 
elaborative recollection processes. 
Our design could be modified easily to compare the brain regions associated with self-
knowledge, and semantic and episodic memory, and to investigate the effects of time 
perspective, with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). fMRI would also allow to 
assess the component process view of personal semantics (Renoult et al., 2012). That is, the 4 
putative types of personal semantics (along with semantic and episodic memory themselves) may 
involve different weightings of such components as self-reflection, spatial and temporal 
processing, executive functions, emotions, and so forth. Of foremost interest regarding personal 
semantics, and perhaps regarding self-knowledge in particular, is the mPFC. Lesion to it impairs 
traits knowledge (Marquine et al., 2016), consistent with multiple fMRI studies linking this 
region to self-referential processing (particularly the ventral mPFC; Denny, Kober, Wager, and 
Ochsner, (2012); Qin et al. (2012)). The mPFC is activated when judging one’s own traits, but 
less so when the decision is made in relation to the past and to the future than in present (e.g., 
D’Argembeau et al., 2010). Instead, past and future self-knowledge are associated with more 
activation of the right inferior parietal cortex compared to present self-knowledge (D’Argembeau 
et al., 2010). Brain regions associated with semantic and episodic memory would also be of key 
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interest [e.g. medial temporal, anterior and inferior temporal, lateral parietal, retrosplenial, and 
several prefrontal regions (Lambon Ralph et al., 2017; Renoult et al., 2012; Spaniol et al., 
2009)]. Additionally, differential activation to semantic and episodic or time perspective could 
help to generate hypotheses about patterns of impairment/preservation in neurological disorders.
 fMRI would complement our findings with ERPs, but this does not imply that all possible 
questions have already been addressed with ERPs. Rather, the present study highlights ERPs’ 
potential for studying the factors – or components – that make personal semantics appear closer 
to either semantic or episodic memory. We found that the frequent and classical 
operationalization of self-knowledge, knowledge of present traits, can be differentiated from 
semantic memory by the P200/N400 and the LPC. Interestingly, the LPC of present self-
knowledge suggests that it is intermediate to semantic and episodic memory. Yet the simple 
distinction of thinking of past and future traits rather than present traits pushed the LPC to be 
closer to episodic memory. Some open questions would benefit from the use of ERPs, including 
the possible influences on the present paradigm of scene construction (Palombo et al., in press), 
the closeness and similarity of the “other” people being considered (Lee & Atance, 2016), and 
taking a first vs. a third person perspective on oneself (Grossmann & Kross, 2014). In the 
meantime, the ancient Greeks’ invitation to “Know thyself” continues to resonate with us. The 
present study suggests that past, present, versus future time perspectives can influence the brain 
correlates of self-knowledge.  Incorporating time perspective into our models may help us 
develop a more comprehensive understanding of personal semantics and perhaps, even more 
broadly, of declarative memory. 
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Appendix A 
The stimuli 
Task	 Word	 Task	 Word	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 depressed	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 soft-spoken	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 bossy	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 logical	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 rash	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 attentive	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 irrational	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 caring	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 trustworthy	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 lovable	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 indifferent	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 invincible	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 flamboyant	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 impulsive	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 self-centered	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 angry	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 casual	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 genuine	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 easygoing	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 terrible	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 inquisitive	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 joyful	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 quick-witted	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 resistant	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 philosophical	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 sluggish	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 old-fashioned	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 worried	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 fashionable	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 inefficient	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 dishonest	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 zestful	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 discreet	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 nasty	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 driven	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 dynamic	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 robust	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 blunt	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 finicky	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 sloppy	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 sarcastic	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 enterprising	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 neat	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 agreeable	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 charming	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 cultured	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 cautious	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 manipulative	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 orderly	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 alert	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 gleeful	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 inaccurate	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 vigilant	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 courteous	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 modest	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 spontaneous	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 merry	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 playful	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 pretentious	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 courageous	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 vulgar	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 oversensitive	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 incompetent	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 hasty	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 demanding	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 grim	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 listless	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 self-righteous	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 anxious	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 harsh	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 persuasive	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 excitable	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 considerate	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 jubilant	
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Self-knowledge	List	1	 neighborly	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 candid	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 bitter	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 ultra-critical	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 talkative	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 disrespectful	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 self-sufficient	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 aggressive	
Self-knowledge	List	1	
narrow-
minded	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 eccentric	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 mathematical	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 liar	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 grave	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 sympathetic	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 suspicious	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 rational	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 discourteous	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 sophisticated	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 rebellious	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 tense	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 sexy	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 brave	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 assertive	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 opinionated	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 complaining	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 brisk	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 cynical	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 broad-minded	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 vengeful	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 well-mannered	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 regretful	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 observant	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 envious	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 grateful	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 offensive	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 hard-hearted	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 conceited	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 combative	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 subtle	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 tidy	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 overcritical	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 self-conscious	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 mediocre	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 cheeky	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 sentimental	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 thoughtful	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 self-assured	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 reckless	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 energetic	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 greedy	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 disruptive	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 obnoxious	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 tolerant	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 idealistic	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 possessive	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 stupid	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 violent	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 pushy	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 nosy	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 mischievous	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 humorless	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 careless	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 peaceful	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 egotistical	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 decent	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 anguished	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 polite	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 smug	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 restless	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 dignified	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 inconsistent	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 bubbly	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 fearful	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 insolent	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 peppy	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 absentminded	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 quarrelsome	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 outspoken	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 jealous	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 stern	
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Self-knowledge	List	1	 industrious	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 sad	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 realistic	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 quiet	
Self-knowledge	List	1	 spirited	 Self-knowledge	List	2	 touchy	
		 		 		 		
Self-knowledge	List	3	 mean	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 amusing	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 sneaky	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 informal	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 impolite	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 hilarious	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 punctual	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 versatile	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 superficial	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 vigorous	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 whiny	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 clumsy	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 temperamental	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 snobbish	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 apprehensive	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 immature	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 hateful	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 lazy	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 impractical	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 crude	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 grouchy	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 overcautious	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 prudent	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 solemn	
Self-knowledge	List	3	
short-
tempered	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 scornful	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 comical	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 intolerant	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 perceptive	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 meddlesome	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 extravagant	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 dependable	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 comforting	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 conscientious	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 noisy	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 hopeful	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 insincere	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 amiable	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 wise	 Semantic	Memory	-	Priest	 forgiving	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 open-minded	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 defenseless	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 overconfident	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 compulsive	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 materialistic	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 irresponsible	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 cooperative	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 helpless	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 accurate	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 weak	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 tactless	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 hot-headed	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 cordial	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 cruel	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 resentful	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 tormented	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 troublesome	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 inexperienced	
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Self-knowledge	List	3	 sensible	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 cranky	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 pompous	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 giggly	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 agitated	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 entertaining	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 loud	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 loyal	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 seductive	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 studious	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 optimistic	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 inoffensive	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 daring	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 disciplined	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 decisive	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 fearless	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 reliable	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 vivacious	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 cowardly	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 responsive	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 explosive	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Soldier	 level-headed	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 hesitant	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 confused	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 innocent	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 indecisive	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 clownish	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 inattentive	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 cheerful	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 dull	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 progressive	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 hypochondriac	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 pessimistic	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 wordy	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 high-spirited	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 boastful	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 sparkling	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 hostile	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 cool-headed	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 deceitful	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 likable	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 malicious	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 contented	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 humble	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 ethical	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 generous	
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Self-knowledge	List	3	 naive	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 truthful	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 crafty	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 daydreamer	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 pleasant	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 tactful	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 congenial	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 ambitious	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 opportunist	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 witty	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 thrifty	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 intelligent	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 affectionate	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 theatrical	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 rude	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Lawyer	 bold	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 tiresome	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 foolish	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 mellow	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 negligent	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 strict	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 gullible	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 ingenious	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 frantic	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 submissive	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 tearful	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 hot-tempered	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 downcast	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 efficient	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 wasteful	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 timid	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 thoughtless	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 outgoing	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 bleak	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 obstinate	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 antisocial	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 exuberant	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 frisky	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 artistic	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 fortunate	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 critical	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 sociable	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 neurotic	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 expressive	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 vain	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 humorous	
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Self-knowledge	List	3	 moody	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 inventive	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 soft-hearted	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 competent	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 argumentative	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 meticulous	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 disobedient	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 persistent	
Self-knowledge	List	3	 imaginative	
Semantic	Memory	-	
Scientist	 precise	
		 		 		 		
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 coercive	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 depressed	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 foolhardy	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 bossy	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 frivolous	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 rash	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 defiant	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 irrational	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 deceptive	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 indifferent	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 stingy	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 self-centered	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 radical	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 old-fashioned	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 spiteful	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 dishonest	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 overbearing	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 finicky	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 fidgety	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 sarcastic	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 fault-finding	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 flamboyant	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 fussy	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 casual	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 gloomy	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 easygoing	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 preoccupied	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 inquisitive	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 distrustful	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 quick-witted	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 insecure	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 philosophical	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 shallow	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 fashionable	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 disagreeable	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 discreet	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 dissatisfied	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 driven	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 uptight	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 robust	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 skeptical	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 impulsive	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 crabby	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 stern	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 desperate	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 angry	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 hyperactive	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 terrible	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 withdrawn	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 touchy	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 arrogant	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 resistant	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 gossipy	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 sluggish	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 irritable	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 worried	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 cold	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 nasty	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 messy	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 enterprising	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 selfish	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 agreeable	
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Episodic	Memory	-	New	 threatening	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 attentive	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 boring	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 caring	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 impatient	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 lovable	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 nervous	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 invincible	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 forgetful	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 genuine	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 jovial	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 joyful	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 prosocial	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 zestful	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 methodical	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 dynamic	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 upright	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 careless	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 diligent	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 whiny	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 maternal	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 temperamental	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 ecstatic	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 apprehensive	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 cunning	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 hateful	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 refined	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 impractical	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 righteous	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 grouchy	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 moderate	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	
short-
tempered	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 sharp-witted	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 noisy	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 glowing	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 insincere	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 resourceful	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 overconfident	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 perfectionist	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 cordial	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 heroic	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 prudent	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 constructive	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 comical	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 prompt	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 perceptive	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 glorious	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 extravagant	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 carefree	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 comforting	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 inspired	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 wise	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 gifted	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 open-minded	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 outstanding	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 cooperative	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 tender	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 accurate	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 calm	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 foolish	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 obedient	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 hot-headed	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 respectful	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 confused	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 gentle	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 cruel	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 protective	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 downcast	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 passionate	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 negligent	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 lively	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 tormented	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 supportive	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 defenseless	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 talented	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 clumsy	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 sincere	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 inexperienced	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 lucky	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 entertaining	
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Episodic	Memory	-	New	 adventurous	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 humble	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 confident	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 frisky	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 helpful	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 inventive	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 belligerent	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 witty	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 stubborn	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 fortunate	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 exceptional	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 dependable	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 romantic	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 disciplined	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 ill-tempered	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 sociable	
Episodic	Memory	-	New	 hopeless	 Episodic	Memory	-	Old	 competent	
	     
